[LITOPYS UPA: Chronicle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army]
SERIES 1
VOLUME 7 - ABSTRACTS OF THE DOCUMENTS


1

This excerpt from a monthly report issued by the Geheime Feldpolizei (Secret Police of the Army) and dated August 18, 1944 speaks of the UPA'S attitude towards the Wehrmacht. The author describes the UPA's stance as temporizing and restrained. He notes an increase in attacks on individual German soldiers and small German units. He says UPA's discipline is good and that the insurgents dispose of excellent human resources. Intelligence work against the UPA is very difficult.

2

This instruction on "How to Behave Towards the UPA," issued by the Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe Nordukraine (Army Command "North Ukraine") on August 18, 1944, speaks of the need to behave well towards the population and forbids use of the term Banden ("bands") in reference to UPA units. The instruction proposes that established terms for local contacts with the UPA be maintained. It forbids discussion of any political issues or decisions on matters touching on politics; assisting the UPA with weapons or training is also forbidden. All contacts made with the UPA must be reported immediately; discussions can be conducted only by experienced intelligence officers.

3

This document, titled "Negotiations with the UPA", issued by the Army Command "North Ukraine" and dated August 18, 1944, states that a temporary agreement on contacts and non-aggression was concluded with an UPA representative on August 11 at the Turka sector of the front. In addition, it states that central discussions were held on August 14 with the UPA "Liaison Staff" and earlier, on August 12, weapons were given to the UPA. The document does not identify the participants of the discussions. It stresses the ban on discussion of political issues and warns that if any co-operation is to be arranged in the future, it must be borne in mind that "the UPA is acting now, as before, exclusively for its own, and not for German interests."

4

This document, titled "The UPA's Armaments," was issued on August 29, 1944, by the Oberkommando des Heeres - OKH (Supreme Command of the German Army) and addressed to the Army Command "North Ukraine." It lists Soviet-made weapons held by the Germans which could be transferred to the UPA. It does not state whether the weapons were, in fact, ever transferred.

5

"Report by Agent 'Hirsch' on the development of the Ukrainian Question" was issued by the Frontaufklärungstrupp 324 -- FATrupp (Front-line reconnaissance unit) on September 1, 1944. On the basis of information from a variety of sources, in particular discussions with Russian and Ukrainian prisoners-of-war and volunteers of the SS-Division "Halychyna" (Galicia), the author concludes that the Ukrainian national movement is very widespread throughout the areas under Soviet occupation and that it constitutes a significant anti-Soviet force in the present political and military situation.

6

The report by Leitstelle III Ost (Abwehr's Section III-East), dated September 9, 1944, states that in the area of the Toronya Pass an UPA detachment known as "Razum" (probably "Rizun") is active; this detachment is very anti-Soviet and is prepared to take part in joint German and Hungarian military actions against the Red Army and Soviet partisans.

7

"Report on the Activities of Bands in August 1944," by Der Höhere SS - und Polizeiführer im Generalgouvernement (Chief of the SS and the Police in the GG) is dated September 10, 1944. It states that the south-western part of District Halychyna is riddled with UPA units which actively oppose NKVD units.

8

The report by Abwehr's Section III-East, dated September 12, 1944, is titled "Attempts at a Political Union of the National Movements of Small Nations." It speaks of the Conference of Oppressed Nations of Eastern Europe and Asia, which took place in Ukraine on November 21-22, 1943, at the initiative of the intelligentsia "from the ranks of the immigrants of Soviet national minorities." The document gives translations of long excerpts from the original Ukrainian report, found by the Germans near a mill in Pidhaitsi (45 km south-west of Ternopil [Tarnopol]). The report was first used by local officials, then turned over to Army Command "North Ukraine." The report lists the names of the delegates to the Conference from the eighteen nations represented and gives its main resolutions. The report's author concludes that the Conference's resolutions were directed against "Nazi Germany and Communist Russia" and laments the fact that neither the USA and Britain, nor their plans, are mentioned in any way in the document.

9

The instruction from the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Regions, dated September 18, 1944, states that "Ukrainian national bands" always fought against the Soviet Union and took a fairly neutral attitude to the Wehrmacht, although they were hostile to the German political leadership. Since the departure of the German civilian administration from Ukraine, no obstacle remains, according to the report, to establish links with the Ukrainian insurgents. For this reason, the SS-Reichsführer has allowed contact to be made with Ukrainian insurgents.

10

This memorandum, dated September 19, 1944 and titled "Activities of the Ukrainian National Resistance Movement (UPA)," speaks of UPA activities in areas occupied by the Germans and on those retaken by the Red Army. it assesses the strength of the UPA and, basing itself on various reports, describes UPA's actions against the Red Army, Soviet partisans and NKVD formations. The memorandum proposes the creation of a central command group which would be assigned the task of keeping track of UPA activities and helping the UPA in its propaganda work, assuming, of course, a change in German policy. Strengthening the UPA behind Red Army lines is judged to be of positive value, since this would provide the UPA with greater ability to engage large numbers of Soviet troops in battle and thus possibly diminish the strength of the Red Army at the front.

11

The report by Frontaufklärungskommando 202 -- FAK (Front-line reconnaissance unit), attached to Army Command "North Ukraine", is dated September 20, 1944. Basing itself on various sources, it describes the condition and activities of UPA detachments behind Red Army lines over a ten-day period. The report notes that Western Ukrainians inducted into the Red Army are put into penal battalions and sent to the front after very limited training. This fact, as well as UPA's propaganda, leads people to desert the Red Army and join the underground. The report contains much information about UPA activities in various areas of Ukraine.

12

This report by FAK 305, attached to Army Group "North Ukraine", is dated September 21, 1944. Calling upon a "well-informed" source, the report states that "in April 1944 the UPA sought and made contact with the British through its leader, Maksym Ruban (real name [Mykola] Lebed)." The report goes on to recommend that contact be established with the UPA, but cautions that this may be realized only after the Germans change their policy towards Ukraine.

13

The document is a German translation of an OUN publication -- Visti z Ukrainy (News from Ukraine), issue No. 2, which, in a number of brief chapters, discusses NKVD activity, the Polish-Ukrainian conflict, the population's self-defense measures and UPA's anti-Soviet propaganda in Eastern and Western Ukraine and Bukovina.

14

The report by SS-Hauptsturmführer Bajder, dated October 5, 1944, includes translations of two documents of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (UHVR): "The Fundamental Principles of the UHVR" (which is, in fact, the political platform of the UHVR) and the "General Proclamation of the UHVR". The latter document is dated June 1944.

15

The notice from the SS-Reichsführer is dated October 11, 1944. Laying claim to an "excellent source," it states that the Supreme Command of the UPA is advising Ukrainians to enlist in the Red Army in order to receive military training which will be useful in the event of an open conflict. The document says further that reports about British attempts to gain influence over the UPA have been confirmed.

16

"Interrogations of Prisoners-of-War,"dated October 12, 1944, recounts the testimony of P. A. Burenko, a deserter from the Red Army, who tells of the activities of "Banderites" in the Zhytomyr (Zhitomir), Kiev and Kamianets'-- Podil'skyi (Kamenets-Podolsky) areas.

17

"The UPA - Ukrainian Insurgent Army" is a report prepared by the Reichssicherheitshauptamt/VI C -- RSHA (Reich Security Administration, Foreign Intelligence), dated October 16, 1944. It speaks of the rise of the OUN and UPA and describes UPA's organizational structure, training, discipline, armaments, areas of activity, intelligence, political program and relationship to the Ukrainian population. The report estimates UPA's strength at 40,000 soldiers and stresses that the insurgents have broad support among the Ukrainian people, in particular in Western Ukraine. There are many errors in the report regarding the UPA leadership, for example, Stepan Shukhevych is identified as UPA's military leader. A map has been attached to this document.

18

The report by the Abwehr, "The Red Army and the NKVD in Battle Against the UPA," dated October 21, 1944, identifies a number of Red Army and NKVD formations that have been deployed into battle against the UPA.

19

The report by the Abwehr's Section III-East, dated October 24, 1944, lists numerous examples of Soviet terrorism perpetrated against the Ukrainian population in revenge for actions carried out by Ukrainian insurgents.

20

The document provides in translation the complete text of the Proclamation of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, addressed "To the Members of the So-called UPA and UNRA." Excerpts from this document, with comments by the Abwehr, were published in Litopys UPA, Vol. 6, pp. 133-136.

21

The report by the command of an unidentified armored division is dated November 1944, and bases itself on interrogations of deserters from the Red Army. It speaks of great losses suffered by the Red Army in its battles with the UPA and of the Soviets' possible withdrawal of some front-line units for battle-duty against the Ukrainian insurgents,

22

The report by an unidentified group is dated November 1944. Based on testimony of former Red Army soldiers, it says that near Luts'ke (Lutsk) 30,000 Red Army and NKVD troops were put into action against the UPA and that the UPA continues to be active in other districts.

23, 24

The documents present two reports by the Abwehr: "The Ukrainian National Resistance Movement -- the UPA," issued by the Fremde Heere Ost -- FHO (Military Intelligence, Eastern Front), attached to the OKH, dated November 1, 1944, and "The OUN-UPA," issued by its Section III-East, dated November 3, 1944. The reports describe the rise of the OUN and the UPA, as well as their aims, activities and attitude to the Ukrainian population. The strength of regular UPA units is estimated at 80,000 to 100,000 men, but the report points out that some Ukrainian sources put those figures between 400,000 and two million.

Document No. 23 also reports that FAK 202 had been assigned to make contact with the UPA. It says that a small number of arms were turned over to the UPA, some radio operators had been trained and an exchange was made of intelligence materials.

According to the report, the UPA through its activities has been able to tie up two or three Red Army divisions and fifteen to twenty NKVD regiments. The writer of the report points out, however, that one cannot expect UPA actions to "significantly weaken the Red Army."

In both documents the Supreme Commander of the UPA is incorrectly identified as Stepan Shukhevych.

Document No. 24 points to the British influence on the political concepts of the Ukrainian underground; this is manifest in the belief that as Germany and the Soviet Union weaken each other, the Ukrainians may be able to attain their goals. The Wehrmacht, which bears no responsibility for the political line of the Reich, is thus playing its part in the battle for Ukrainian interests. The same applies to other nationalities (called "minorities" in the text) of the Soviet Union, which together with the Ukrainians will wage a battle of liberation against Russia.

The most sensational piece of "information" in this report is the rumour which claims that as far back as 1943 Stalin's plan was to make Stepan Bandera a member of the Soviet Ukrainian government and thus gain influence over the OUN and the UPA.

25

The document is part of a broader survey of the "activities of bands" behind the Soviet lines for October 5-31, 1944. It points out that insurgent activities have increased markedly in Halychyna and North-West Ukraine; activities that had been taking place in the Carpathian Mountains, the sub-Carpathian region, and the areas of Lviv (Lvov), Ternopil', Rivne (Rovno) and Kholm (Chelm) have now spread to include the Vinnytsia (Vinnitsa), Zhytomyr and Novhorod-Volyns'kyi (Novgorod-Volynsk) regions.

26

"The Partisan Movement in Ukraine" is a translation of the testimony given by a prisoner-of-war, Lt. Shevelev of the Red Army. Shevelev says there are two types of partisans -- those who are fighting "for an idea" and those who are hiding out for a variety of reasons. The latter type is easily captured by the NKVD and put into penal battalions. But the followers of Bandera, A. Mel'nyk and T. "Bul'ba" are fighting "for an idea" and are considered a great danger to the Soviet government. For this reason a special proclamation was addressed to them by the Soviet regime, but it failed to bring the desired effect and did not put an end to insurgent activity. The Ukrainian insurgents are very anti-Russian in their attitude and wish to separate forever from Russia. For this reason Russian soldiers, although themselves anti-Soviet, fight so doggedly against the Ukrainians. The Ukrainian nationalists identify the struggle against Bolshevism with the battle against Russians and Poles. According to Shevelev, the struggle for national rights must be de-emphasized in order to place the battle against Bolshevism on the right track. Furthermore, there is need for a political and military co-ordinating centre, one which could control the insurgency movement.

27

The report by the Abwehr's Section III-East, dated November 9, 1944, is based on another report by FA Trupp 324, which discusses the development of the anti-Soviet resistance movement in Ukraine. The report claims that an all-Ukrainian political co-ordinating body, the Spilka Vyzvolennya Ukrayiny - SVU ("Union for the Liberation of Ukraine"), has been created, whose aim is to unite the OUNSD, OUN (Melnyk faction), UPA, UNRA, Hetmanites and other smaller parties. The political goal of this centre is to prepare a revolution and general uprising against the Soviets under the slogan "Freedom for Nations." The centre already has at its disposal large forces of the so-called "Greens" (armed UPA and UNRA detachments), numbering 500,000 men, and an enormous network of secret organizations scattered throughout Ukraine, whose total number is unknown. The document also mentions the activities of the Sluzhba Bespeky (Security service), which is waging terror against representatives of the Soviet regime, particularly those of Russian nationality. It also states that people working for German intelligence (even Russians) have been invited to join the UPA and that they are no longer threatened with execution by the Ukrainian insurgents, as had been the case before. The report states further that the SVU is establishing centres, similar to the one in the historic Kholodnyi Yar in the Chyhyryn (Chigirin) region, and that it is trying to infiltrate Soviet institutions with its own people. SVU propaganda attacks both the Soviet and Germans. The British are supplying the UPA with German-made weapons. The report states that the source of this information is under the impression that UPA's weapons may be not only of German make, but also supplied by the Germans. The report concludes that at present political ties between Germany and the Ukrainian insurgents are impossible and that links between the UPA and the Wehrmacht can be regarded only on purely military terms.

The report is full of glaring errors and distortions.

28

The report by the OKH, dated November 9, 1944, estimates the number of Red Army and NKVD units sent into battle against the UPA between April and October 1944. It states that a decrease in Soviet activity at the front resulting from Red Army battles with the UPA can only be expected if the Germans assist the UPA in every possible way.

29

This excerpt from a report by the Abwehr's Section II-East, dated November 11, 1944, and titled "Attitude of the Poles to Ukrainians," notes that the Soviets' anti-Ukrainian policy is being actively supported by Polish circles. For this reason, according to the report, agreement between the Poles and Ukrainians will not be possible even in the future. The report states further that some members of the Polish Armia Krajowa -- AK (Home Army), as well as certain Russians, believe that some sort of secret truce may have been concluded between the UPA and the AK, or that the two groups may be secretly co-operating because of their common opposition to the Soviet Union. The attitude of the UPA towards the Polish Army led by Berling remains hostile.

30

The report by Dr. Arlt of the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Regions, dated November 17, 1944, informs about the creation of the UHVR, as the supreme political authority above the OUN and UPA. The strength of the UPA is estimated at 60,000 men. Appended to the report are German translations of the appeal by the Foreign Representation of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (ZP UHVR), titled "To All Ukrainian Living Abroad," dated September 1944, the "General Proclamation of the UHVR," dated June 1944, the "Platform of the UHVR" and the "Provisional Structure of the UHVR."

31

The report by SS-Obersturmbannführer Witiska, head of the "H" Group of the Sicherheitsdienst - SD (Security Service) in Bratislava, is dated November 21, 1944, and addressed to the Reichskommisar of the Police, SS-Gruppenführer und General Leutenant H. Müller. It states that according to a "very reliable source" with access to the OUN and UPA, the AK seems to be trying to make contact with the UPA in order to organize a common struggle against the Soviets. This change in approach by the Polish underground is attributed to the failure of the Warsaw uprising.

32

The report by Hauptmann und Kommando-Führer Kirn, commander of FAK 202, attached to Heeresgruppe "A" (Army Group), dated November 27, 1944, speaks of the activities of a reconnaissance party behind Soviet lines. The seven-man team made a raid into enemy territory, traversing 180 km behind front lines. The raid began on October 6 and ended on November 7, when Captain Kirn's group arrived by special plane in Cracow, allegedly accompanied by two representatives of UPA command. Contact was made with an UPA-unit on October 16 and almost two weeks were spent gathering intelligence. Members of the UPA-unit were trained in various methods of maintaining liason. Kirn regards the raid a success and feels others like it could be carried out if appropriate preparations were made. The group sustained some losses, but the fact that it spent some time behind enemy lines and fought alongside an UPA-unit Kirn considers important, particularly since it was well-received by both the local UPA command and the population. Kirn also mentions that several hundred German soldiers (Versprengte - dispersed troops) are being well-treated by the UPA and could receive supplies or be removed from the area by air.

The UPA is eager to fill its ranks and is using all possible means to intensify its work among local Red Army recruits, who are being sent to the front by the Soviets after insufficient training lasting only several days. The UPA directs its activities chiefly against the NKVD and the Soviet civilian administration; it fights the Red Army only if forced in self-defense.

The political section of the report confirms the creation of the UHVR as an all-Ukrainian centre co-ordinating the liberation struggle and directed against all occupying powers: the Soviet Russians, the Russian Vlasov Army and the Germans.

Kirn states that it will not be possible to place the UPA under German control. Military co-operation could take place if "the political atmosphere were to improve." In conclusion, Kirn recommends that actions similar to his be continued in the future. The document includes a map.

33

This report by Captain Kirn, dated November 22, 1944, describes UPA's organizational structure, discipline, tactics, armaments, equipment, uniforms and provisions of food. It points out both the strengths and weaknesses of the UPA.

34

The notice, dated December 1, 1944, states that, according to a telephone conversation intercepted at the Stopnytsia sector of the front, the UPA has smashed the 127th NKVD Regiment and other enemy forces in the Zhytomyr, Zhmerynka and Kamianets'-Podils'kyi districts and that the insurgents have taken Rava Rus'ka and surrounding population centres.

35

The report by the OKH, dated December 5, 1944, titled "Resistance Movements Behind the Russian Lines," is cited here by that section of the report which deals with the UPA. It states that UPA units have come out of the Carpathian Mountains and are active in the areas of Lviv, Stanyslaviv (Ivano-Frankivske) and Peremyshl' (Przemysl). Most of their activity is aimed against the NKVD and the Soviet administration. Reinforced units of the NKVD have been sent to protect east-west transportation lines. A map has been attached to this document.

36

The report by SS-Obersturmbannführer Witiska to Lt. Gen. Müller in Berlin, dated December 17, 1944, includes comments on translated UPA and UHVR leaflets and brochures. On the basis of these materials, Witiska asserts that even after occupation by the Soviets, "the Ukrainian resistance movement's hostility to Germany remains unabated." He points out that in issue No. 1 of Visti z Ukrainy (News from Ukraine), it is clearly. stated that during May, June and July 1944, the UPA fought against both the Soviets and Germans and that it deceived the Germans, feigning its loyalty. As proof of UPA's anti-German stance, Witiska notes that the underground accuses the German occupational administration of giving lists to Soviet officials containing the names of Ukrainians forcibly inducted into the Wehrmacht and the "Halychyna" Division. In conclusion, he reveals that he has just learned of the establishment of the UHVR.

37

SS-Obersturmbannführer Witiska's report, "The UPA and the Vlasov Units," dated December 18, 1944 and addressed to Lt. Gen. Müller, recounts a conversation between two members of the UPA and one of the informers of Intelligence Section "N", who was assigned to ascertain UPA's attitude toward Gen. A. Vlasov and his units. It appears that the UPA and the Ukrainian population of Halychyna and Volyn' in general have grave reservations and doubts about Germany's future plans for the East and regarding the Ukrainian "question." The UPA members expressed surprise that the Germans seem to have learned nothing at all from the 1941-1944 period, and that they still refuse to assist the UPA. The UPA spokesmen regard Vlasov as a repetition of the error made by Britain in 1918-1920. At that time the British supported Kolchak, Denikin and Yudenich, thinking they would fight the Bolsheviks, but they turned instead against the Ukrainians who were themselves battling the Bolsheviks. In no case will the 500,000-strong UPA subject itself to the control of Gen. Vlasov. The UPA is fighting for an independent Ukraine and is creating a purely Ukrainian army. For that reason it will not follow Vlasov, either politically or militarily. Witiska points out that his "reliable source", although himself Ukrainian, recounted this conversation without any comments.

38

The report contains excerpts from interrogations of prisoners-of-war on the subject of "bands" operating behind Soviet lines and their struggle against the NKVD and the civilian administration. In May, a whole Soviet infantry division was sent against "Bandera's people," but without success. In Western Ukraine, there are "Vlasovites" as well as "Banderites" and the two groups often co-operate with each other. There are some German and Italian soldiers among the Banderites who were unable to get through the front back to their units. The document informs that the Banderites are defending villages against NKVD attacks and very often release prisoners, as they did, for example, in Rivne in September 1944, when 800 people were freed. The insurgents forbid the peasants to help the Soviets in gathering the harvest under threat of burning their villages and the peasants have escaped into the forests. When NKVD troops began to harvest the crops themselves, they were attacked, killed or forced to flee.

39

"Brief Reports on the UPA, 1944-1945," contain excerpts from various reports, announcements and interrogations of prisoners-of-war between August 17, 1944 and March 20, 1945, on the subject of UPA activities in various areas and in particular, on UPA's military operations. Most reports are about the UPA, but some mention "Bulba's" and Vlasov's formations and a "Free Ukraine" group, which is said to have been formed in the Zhytomyr area to fight the Soviets and which is hostile to Vlasov.

40

This report by the OKH, dated January 6, 1945, speaks of "The Ukrainian National Resistance Movement - UPA". It says that in comparison to November, resistance activity in December did not diminish; on the contrary, it took on an even greater political significance. The report also points to various areas between the Buh (Bug) and the Dnister (Dniestr) Rivers where the UPA was active.

41

The report by SS-Obersturmbannführer Witiska, dated January 17, 1945, and addressed to SS-Standartenführer Ehlich at the RSHA, deals with "UPA's Battles with the Red Army." It states that in the areas of Sambir (Sambor), Stryi, Lavochne and Uzhok dogged battles are being fought between the UPA and the Red Army. Further, it says that "Lebid, the leader of UPA-West, a well-known Banderite activist, has again returned to Halychyna. He had been previously in Eastern Slovakia." The report ends by stating that the poet P. Tychyna, "who lives in Kiev," has addressed an appeal to all refugees, calling on them to return to Ukraine without fear of reprisals. Tychyna claims that the Soviets have renounced their anti-Ukrainian stance and they alone are capable of establishing a "free and independent Ukraine."

42

The report by Abwehr's Section I-East about "The State of Affairs at the Kolomyia Sector of the Front" is dated January 19, 1945 and is based on interrogations of Boris Glybin, a prisoner-of-war. The report states that well-armed groups of insurgents are active in the Carpathian Mountains and are inflicting severe losses on the Red Army. Byelorussians, stationed at the front, are reluctant to fight and frequently exchange fire with other Red Army units. It is believed that even Red Army soldiers have grown tired of the war. The question frequently put, "Why should we keep fighting now that the motherland is free?" is being strenuously parried by the army's political commissars.

43

The evaluation of "The Ukrainian Movement" by the Supreme Air Command is dated January 22, 1945 and gives a brief history of the Ukrainian nationalist movement from the year 1918. It stresses the Ukrainians' disappointment with German policies and their battle against the Germans and Soviets. It describes the rise of the UPA and the UHVR and speaks of OUN's position.

Politically, the Ukrainian movement remains independent, the report states, and clearly opposes all forms of imperialism - Soviet Russia's, Vlasov's and Germany's. In terms of internal policies, it rejects completely the principles on which the USSR is structured, although it approves the more positive aspects of socialism, such as state ownership of major industries, transport and the like.

The strength of UPA-North in the summer of 1944 is judged to be 90,000 men, that of UPA-West -- at 40,000. The operative unit of UPA-North is the battalion, of UPA-West -- the company. Most of UPA's arms are of Soviet manufacture and training of the insurgents is considered to be generally good.

The short-term goal of the Ukrainian movement is to defend the country and its people from Soviet aggression; the long-term goal is to create an independent state. "UPA's actions spare German forces. A systematic control of UPA's actions, aimed at specific targets, would lead to an even greater relief for the German Wehrmacht."

The report ends by observing that if Western Ukrainians succeed in bringing Eastern Ukrainians into the struggle they may fulfill their long-term goal.

44

The report by SS-Obersturmbannführer Witiska to Lt. Gen. Müller, dated January 24, 1945, deals with the UHVR. It is full of distortions and errors. It claims that Lebid (sic) is head of the UHVR and that members of the OUNSD, OUN (Melnyk faction), and UPA-East are denied entry into the UHVR. It attributes the creation of the UHVR to the desire to establish a political centre which could take control of the OUN, most of whose activists have fled to the West.

Witiska's informer seems to have been asked to join the UHVR.

45

The document, prepared by SS-Obersturmbannführer Witiska for Lt. Gen. Müller, recounts the content of the UPA leaflet Visti z Kraiu (News from Home), which gives an overview of UPA battles against the NKVD and Red Army units.

46

"Resistance Movements behind Soviet Lines" is an excerpt from a report by the Supreme Air Command dated January 25, 1945, which repeats many ideas expressed in other reports, for example, the testimony of prisoners-of-war that is given in Document No. 38.

47

This is an almost exact repetition of Document No. 44, but addressed to SS-Standartenführer Ehlich and dated January 26, 1945.

48

The document, which comes from the Archives of the ZP UHVR, is a "Fifteen-Day Report on UPA Activity in Enemy Territory." It contains brief notices from various sources about UPA activities between August 1944 and January 1945. Some of the notices tend to be sensational, such as the news that an UPA unit, which liberated fifteen German SS-men and nursed a wounded SS colonel back to health, has eighteen British airplanes at its disposal and probably receives its arms and ammunition by air, or the claim that an uprising against the Soviets by Ukrainians and all other subjugated nations of the East is being planned for the beginning of 1945.

49

"The Ukrainian Insurgent Army" is a report by the German Legation in Bratislava to the Ministry of External Affairs, dated February 2, 1945. It states briefly that the UPA was created to battle against two forms of imperialism -- Soviet and German. It says that UPA has about 100,000 men and hopes to attain its goal, an independent state, through the mutual weakening of its two enemies.

50

The report by the Abwehr's Section III-East about anti-Soviet resistance in the L'viv area is dated February 28, 1945. Basing itself on the testimony of Soviet prisoners-of-war, it speaks of the maltreatment of Ukrainians by the Soviet occupational regime. The Soviet policy drives people to escape into the forests (often in order to avoid mobilization) and swell the ranks of the insurgents. The UPA force in the L'viv district is said to be about 10,000 men.

51

The document is mainly a repetition of the February 2, 1945, report of the German Legation in Bratislava (Document No. 49). Among new elements found in this document is the remark that the Kremlin has embraced a "broad pro-Ukrainian policy," which is seen in the forced removal of the Polish population from Ukraine and the annexation of Carpathian Ukraine, by which actions the Soviets hope to weaken UPA's influence on the population. The report mentions Vlasov and the difficulties encountered concerning the establishment of the Ukrainian National Committee. The report's author expresses the opinion that under present circumstances the UPA tends to overestimate its potential.

52

"On the present State in Ukraine" is a report by the Abwehr's Section III-East, dated February 15, 1945, and based on hearings held with Ukrainian deserters from the Red Army. It speaks of the general mobilization of all males 18 to 50 years of age and reports on the NKVD garrisons, numbering from one hundred to one thousand men each, which have been sent into villages to enforce the mobilization order and to fight against the UPA. The report states that the numbers of Ukrainian and even Russian deserters from the Red Army have increased recently.

53

The document, dated February 16, 1945, although signed by the ZP UHVR, is a translation of the UHVR leaflet Germany's So-called "New Ostpolitik" and our Attitude toward it. The main thrust of the leaflet is as follows: the aim of the "new German policy" is to enable the Germans to return to the East and destroy Bolshevism. This policy is to be based on a form of co-operation, not yet clearly defined, between the Germans and the subjugated nations of the East. The meeting between H. Himmler, the Chief of the German Police and Minister of Internal Affairs, and Vlasov, the former Soviet general, is a true indication of this type of co-operation. The Germans are trying to win Ukrainians and members of other subjugated nations over to their side and place them all under Vlasov's control. These attempts to save Germany with the blood of the subjugated peoples and to reinstitute a reactionary Russian regime with Vlasov's help are rejected by all Ukrainian circles, not only by the OUN and the UPA. The way to achieve liberty and the destruction of Stalinist Bolshevism is by having all the subjugated nations wage a united battle for their own independent states. For the last twenty-three years the Ukrainian nation has been engaged in a protracted battle against Bolshevism for the freedom of all nations. Ukrainians have opposed both German and Soviet imperialism and have established the UPA which has grown to become a major revolutionary factor in the East. The Ukrainian people, along with other Eastern nations, are battling all forms of imperialism and thus reject all present German and Vlasovite plans and any other imperialistic plans that may crop up in the future.

54

The document, dated February 17, 1945, is a translation, accompanied by a letter, of the UPA leaflet titled The Struggle of the Ukrainian People Against the Forces of Occupation. The leaflet explains the motives and goals of the UPA and UPA's attitude toward Soviet partisans and the German forces of occupation. It also includes the "Oath of Allegiance of the UPA Soldier," which binds UPA members to fight not only for Ukrainian independence, but also for the independence of all subjugated nations.

55

The report by SS-Standartenführer Witiska to Lt. Gen. Müller, dated February 20, 1945 and titled "Suspected Contacts Between the UHVR and the Allies," states that two currents of thought exist within the UHVR -- one which favours co-operation with Germany and even recognized the authority of Gen. P. Shandruk, who had been authorized by the Germans to create a Ukrainian government, and the another, which rejects co-operation with the Germans and seeks contacts with the Allies. With the latter concept in mind the OUN activist Yevhen Vretsiona and his wife have left Halychyna. They had stayed with Vretsiona's brother, Volodymyr Vretsiona, in St. Pölten, and have since departed for parts unknown, presumably Switzerland. Witiska asks that discretion be maintained in this matter, because his informer, who was in line to become the UHVR's legal advisor, fears for his life should the Ukrainians discover that he is a double agent. According to Witiska, UPA-West has around 80,000 soldiers, most of whom are being kept in reserve. The UPA is fighting for the independence of Ukraine and will oppose any Vlasov forces should these appear in Western Ukraine.

56

The report from Bratislava, dated February 24, 1945, states that the UPA is active throughout Eastern, Western, and Southern Ukraine defending villages against the NKVD and its Polish helpers. The UPA units are well-armed and are also battling retreating German and Hungarian soldiers. The insurgents' slogan is "Down with Stalin and Hitler -- Freedom for Nations and the Individual." They oppose both National-Socialism and Bolshevism. Their goal is an independent united Ukrainian state.

57

The "Fifteen-Day Report on UPA Units in Enemy Territory" by FAK 202, attached to Army Group "Centre" is dated March 1, 1945. It compiles information from various sources about UPA activities. Mention is made of UPA units and their commanders "Osyp" and "Baida," who are active in the districts of Turka, Skolie and Stanyslaviv during the fall of 1944. There are accounts of NKVD provocations aimed at confusing the Ukrainian populace. These provocations often succeed and result in the deportation of whole villages as punishment.

58

The report by SS-Standartenführer Witiska is based on the testimony of Red Army deserters and German soldiers who had escaped from Soviet captivity. The first part deals with UPA activity in Halychyna; the second speaks of the UPA in Volyn' and the third looks at UPA "Propaganda." The last part of the document discusses how UPA units are structured and states that the company is the operational unit of the UPA. It also mentions that a large number of German soldiers, Obersturmbannführer von Kisten from the "Halychyna" Division and even an unidentified German general are at the time with the UPA. The document speaks further of heavy UPA battles in Chornyi Lis (Black Forest) near Stanyslaviv and repeats the claim made earlier that the UPA has eighteen planes at its disposal, flown by German pilots. Mention is also made of the killing of Maj. Gen. Rudnev, S. Kovpak's former deputy, by the UPA. At the end, Witiska asks that he be kept informed from time to time on the accuracy of his intelligence reports, for this would help him control his agents and informers. It is apparent that he is uncertain of the credibility of his sources.

59

"UPA Activity in January 1945," an Abwehr report dated March 7, 1945, consists of two parts. The first part speaks of increased UPA activity, especially near large cities and in the areas east of the Carpathian Mountains. The second part is an exact repetition of the conclusion of Doc. No. 51, published in this volume. A map has been attached to the first part of this document.

60

The report from Slovakia, dated March 8, 1945 and addressed to Lt. Gen. Müller, claims that two separate wings exist within the UHVR -- a democratic wing and a totalitarian one that is patterned on the German Nazis. "The President of the UHVR and the Commander of the UPA, Lebid (sic) seems to belong to the democrats."

61

The report by the OKH, dated March 18, 1945, speaks of the deportation of the Polish population of Halychyna westward of the River Sian. The activities of the Ukrainian insurgents have been markedly curtailed as a result of enormous repressions applied by the NKVD against the population.

62

The "Fifteen-Day Report on UPA Activities Behind Enemy Lines," dated April 1, 1945, was prepared by FAK 202, attached to Army Group "Centre." The report gives brief notices about the activities of UPA-West, UPA-North and UPA-East. It is based on a number of sources, in particular on the testimony of prisoners-of-war and deserters from the Red Army.



VOLUME 7



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