



A Plan for Europe

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Excerpts from *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 1995 Volume 74, No. 2.

... Admittedly, the expansion of NATO, even if accompanied by a positive resolution of Russia's concerns, will create new problems. The most important of these will be the status and security of the Baltic states and Ukraine. The fiercely independent Baltic states want to be an integral part of Europe. Ukraine currently defines itself as "neutral"; it has resisted Russian pressures to integrate itself into the Moscow-dominated security treaty of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and it is the only former Soviet republic to have created a large national army.

Russia has grudgingly accepted the independence of the Baltic republics and has formally acquiesced to the independence of Ukraine - but there is a widespread consensus among the Russian political elite that eventually, in some fashion, Ukraine will and should be reintegrated under the Kremlin. That aspiration makes it important that the proposed treaty between NATO and the Russian Federation not be confused with the acceptance by the West of any equivalence between NATO and the CIS. The treaty, therefore, should be with Russia directly. Russian officials would like to establish NATO/CIS parity because it would aid Moscow's efforts to reintegrate the former Soviet Union. In January 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher was uncharacteristically forceful but quite right when he warned that "Russia must avoid any attempt to reconstitute the USSR."

The Baltic and Ukrainian issues pose rather different political and psychological complications. The Baltic reaction to NATO expansion is quite predictable: the Balts will step their efforts to become the next members...

The Ukrainian problem is more delicate and unpredictable. If Russia accepts the two-track approach (first, a formal treaty of global security cooperation between NATO and the Russian Federation; and second, a new mechanism for special security consultations within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), Ukraine may be less likely to press for immediate formal membership, especially if in the meantime its relations with Russia become more stable. If Russia's reaction to NATO is altogether hostile, Ukraine will be faced with a divisive choice. Some Ukrainians will urge Kyiv to press more vigorously for NATO membership, especially if their own relations with Russia should also worsen. Others will advocate accommodation with Moscow.

The problem of Ukraine cannot be deferred. Ukraine is just too big, too important, and its existence too sensitive a matter to both Russia and the West. As NATO expands and seeks to establish a special security relationship with Russia, it will have to consider Ukraine's new relationship to NATO. In doing so, the alliance has to be

conscious of Russia's special sensitivity on the Ukrainian question, but also of the West's broader interest in consolidating geopolitical pluralism in the territory of the former Soviet Union. Ukraine's secure independence is clearly the most decisive and substantive expression of that post-Soviet pluralism. That is why the allies unanimously agree that Ukraine's long-term survival is in NATO's interest.

Russia has to face the Ukrainian issue as well. For the Kremlin, keeping open the option of the eventual reabsorption of Ukraine is a central strategic objective. Accordingly, Moscow recognizes that it would not be in Russia's interest to intensify Ukrainian insecurity or precipitate conditions in which the eastward expansion of NATO prompts Ukraine to seek early admission into the alliance. That consideration should serve as a powerful incentive to Russia to explore the possibility of joint arrangements with the West that, in Moscow's estimate, might reduce the likelihood of dramatic changes in the geostrategic landscape of the "near abroad".

The overarching NATO-Russian Federation treaty should therefore include a special annex containing a joint, formal, and very explicit commitment by both parties to Ukraine's independence and security. At this stage, such a commitment need neither foreclose nor promise any future relationship between Ukraine and NATO, nor any special and truly voluntary cooperation between Russia and Ukraine. It would provide assurance to Ukraine that its political status is respected, enduring, and in the interest of both NATO and the Russian Federation - irrespective of the innermost fantasies of the Russian signatories.

The NATO-Russian Federation guarantees for Ukraine would be derived from the joint interest of the two parties in a non-antagonistic process of meshing transatlantic and Eurasian security. If that interest exists or can be nurtured through constructive discussions undertaken by a strategically focused U.S. leadership, such an agreement with Moscow is attainable.

At some point in the future - but probably only some years after 2000 - both the European Union and NATO will have to reassess the nature of their relationship with Russia and Ukraine. Assuming that by then the European Union and its security arm, the WEU, will have expanded to encompass several Central European states (perhaps including also the Baltics), it will be natural and timely for the EU to consider more comprehensive ties with its new neighbours to the east. The same will be true of NATO, especially if in the meantime a democratically consolidated and economically reformed Ukraine has successfully enlarged the scope of its participation in the Partnership for Peace and satisfied the criteria for full membership.

It is surely in Russia's interest to become more closely tied to Europe, notwithstanding the complications inherent in Russia's Eurasian geography and identity. It is surely in the long-range interest of Ukraine gradually to redefine itself as a Central European state. The proposed arrangement would provide the needed historical pause and the requisite sense of security for Russia and Ukraine to work out a stable balance between

close economic cooperation and separate political coexistence - while also moving closer to Europe as Europe moves toward them.

Of course, a major disruption in European-Russian or Russian-Ukrainian relations cannot be ruled out. The Russian obsession with big-power status, the growing desire to reconstitute a bloc of at least satellite states within the territory of the former Soviet Union, and the effort to limit the sovereignty of the Central European states could produce a crisis with the West. In such a case, an enlarged NATO would have no choice but to become again a defensive alliance against an external threat.

The resulting disruption in the construction of a wider transcontinental security system would be damaging, especially to Russia itself. Several decades ago, the Soviet Union spurned participation in the Marshall Plan and chose instead to go it alone - until it collapsed from historical fatigue. Threatened by the new Muslim states to the south and facing a possible future conflict in the east, today's Russia is in no position to engage also in a conflict with the West. Moscow can perhaps delay somewhat the enlargement of NATO, but it can neither halt Europe's growth nor prevent the concomitant extension of the Euro-Atlantic security umbrella over the wider Europe. It can merely isolate itself again. The Kremlin leaders should realize this. The two-track plan outlined here could help them avoid the basic error made by their Soviet predecessors...

Sins of omission

Extract from *The Economist*
December 3rd 1994

The European Union is on the verge of repeating in Ukraine the mistake the West made three years ago in Russia

UKRAINE at the end of 1994 is remarkably like Russia at the end of 1991. It has a young team of radical reformers who enjoy the patronage of a strong president willing to bet his power on the outcome of reform. Boris Yeltsin had Yegor Gaidar, Anatoly Chubais and others. Under Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine's early reformers, Roman Shpek (economics minister) and Viktor Yushchenko (head of the central bank), have been reinforced by two deputy prime ministers, Viktor Pinzenyk and Igor Mityukov, and a privatization chief, Yury Yekbanurov.

Three years ago Russia freed prices, opened up to foreign trade and slashed its budget deficit from over 30% Of GDP in 1991 to zero in the first quarter of 1992. Ukraine has recently liberalized prices and lifted export quotas. It has committed itself to unify the exchange rates, do away with