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8 August: Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma to arrive in Moscow for a visit
UKRAINE
NEW PROSECUTOR-GENERAL PROMISES TO SOLVE GONGADZE CASE... The Ukrainian parliament on 4 July approved by 347 votes President Leonid Kuchma's candidate for prosecutor-general, Svyatoslav Pyskun. The Prosecutor-General's Office had long been discredited under its previous head, Mykhaylo Potebenko, partly due to his is failure to make any progress in solving the murder of opposition journalist Heorhiy Gongadze. Pyskun promised shortly after his appointment to resolve Gongadze's murder. RFE/RL contributor Taras Kuzio, who is resident fellow and adjunct professor at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies in Toronto, noted that the most contentious issue in any investigation will be whether Pyskun utilizes the tapes made secretly by security guard Mykola Melnychenko in Kuchma's office, the FBI expert reports on the tapes, and the testimony Melnychenko has offered to give in the United States. Pyskun has created a new investigative group on Gongadze and has hinted at undertaking a fifth autopsy on the headless corpse found in November 2000. ("RFE/RL Newsline," 7 August)
...SPARKING QUESTIONS ABOUT ITS SUDDEN URGENCY. Why is Pyskun in such a hurry to deal with this case, which is not the only example of political repression or intimidation of journalists, Kuzio asked in the 7 August "RFE/RL Newsline" piece. One key factor is the presidential elections due in October 2004, he offered: The Gongadze scandal is one of the main reasons why Kuchma is so discredited domestically. The "Kuchmagate" affair that erupted after November 2000 led to the creation of Ukraine's largest protest movements and the defeat of the pro-Kuchma For a United Ukraine (ZYU) in the March elections. Any candidate proposed by Kuchma to replace him as his chosen successor would stand little chance of being elected, unless Kuchma succeeds in salvaging his image. The opposition plans to launch mass protests calling for early presidential elections on 16 September, the second anniversary of Gongadze's abduction. ("RFE/RL Newsline," 7 August)
PUTIN, KUCHMA SAY TRADE DISPUTE IS SETTLED... President Vladimir Putin announced after his talks with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 8 August 2002) that he is grateful to Kuchma for quickly responding to his invitation to come to Moscow and resolve recent trade tensions between the two countries, Russian and Western news agencies reported on 9 August. Relations have been strained since Russia introduced restrictions on imports of Ukrainian pipes earlier this month and Ukraine retaliated with barriers against 19 categories of Russian goods, ITAR-TASS reported. Putin announced that during the latest meetings, he and Kuchma decided to lift most of the new restrictions. He also said that he will sign the final accord on joint Russian-German-Ukrainian cooperation in natural-gas transportation at the CIS summit in Chisinau in October. The two presidents continued their talks on 9 August at Putin's residence outside Moscow. VY
...BUT OTHERS DISAGREE. Despite the optimistic declarations, Putin and Kuchma have failed to end the trade war that has raged in recent weeks, "Kommersant-Daily" reported on 8 August. Although the barriers against Ukrainian pipes and Russia goods were lifted, Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko, who took part in the talks, said that Ukraine has not agreed to lift a 30 percent duty on Russian-made automobiles, which is a sharp blow to Russian automakers. The BBC commented on 8 August that Kuchma's desire for closer links with Moscow conflicts with Ukraine's improving relations with the European Union. Kuchma is now faced with the choice of either complying with EU economic standards or moving toward a closer economic partnership with Russia. VY
Last week, Poland concluded the Administration of Justice and Internal Affairs Chapter in its European Union accession talks in Brussels. Warsaw pledged to beef up control of its 1,200-kilometer border with Russia's Kaliningrad Oblast, Belarus, and Ukraine to prevent illegal migration, as well as smuggling of goods and trafficking of drugs and arms, after Poland joins the EU. Some Western media commented that Poland's obligations under this negotiation chapter -- the country's 26th closed chapter -- are tantamount to erecting a new "Berlin Wall" on the country's eastern and northern frontiers, which are expected to become the EU's external frontiers as early as 1 January 2004.
Poland's obligations under this chapter involve a serious overhaul of its border guards and, understandably, mean making sizeable expenditures from the state budget. Interior Minister Krzysztof Janik said in a recent press interview that in order to qualify for joining the Schengen agreements, which may take place around 2007, Poland needs $250 million euros ($245 million) to refurbish its border-guard force and infrastructure. Janik hopes that up to 75 percent of this sum may be covered by various EU funds and programs.
Last week, Poland committed itself to increasing its current border-guard force of some 12,000 servicemen and civilians to 18,000. By 2006, the country will increase the force by 3,200, hiring 5,300 professional frontier guards and 1,000 more civil servants while phasing out 3,100 army conscripts who are currently deployed.
The government plans to buy and equip seven helicopters and two light aircraft for the border guards, as well as night-vision surveillance devices and other necessary equipment. The number of frontier watchtowers will be increased in order to space them at a distance not exceeding 20 kilometers.
Poland's accession to the EU will, of course, mean tougher restrictions on travelers from Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Warsaw will introduce visa requirements for them as of 1 July 2003. At present, nobody is able to imagine the scale of technical difficulties or the political and socioeconomic consequences of this upcoming operation.
Chief EU negotiator Jan Truszczynski said last year in Brussels that in 2000, Poland was visited by 5.9 million Belarusians, 2.8 million Russians, and 6.1 million Ukrainians. The same year, Truszczynski added, Polish consulates all over the world issued only 185,000 visas.
But Truszczynski's estimates of eastern visitors to Poland may be much lower than the real figures. According to the Warsaw-based government-sponsored Center for Eastern Studies, in 2000, Poland was visited by 4.4 million Russians from Kaliningrad Oblast alone (it should be noted here that Russia's Kaliningrad exclave is inhabited by some 1 million people). Some 90 percent of these visits, the center asserts, were made by people engaged in petty cross-border trade, which primarily means smuggling of alcohol, cigarettes, and other goods.
Such cross-border business is the main source of livelihood for hundreds of thousands, if not for millions, of people in both Poland and the three above-mentioned post-Soviet countries. When Poland tightens its eastern and northern borders, there will unavoidably occur "local economic disasters" in the borderland regions of the four countries. As for Poland's eastern and northern regions, they still may hope for some assistance from Brussels under various development and restructuring programs. But who will help people living under the penury of the Lukashenka and Kuchma economies? And what about the Kaliningrad region with its highest rates of criminality and HIV infection in all of Russia?
Poland officially advertises its role as a promoter of European integration values on post-Soviet territory -- particularly in Ukraine and Belarus -- but it is hardly believable that it will be able to perform this role seriously after the line of European prosperity and affluence moves some 600 kilometers eastward and becomes a new "Berlin Wall" for Belarusians and Ukrainians for a decade or longer. It is clear even today that not only Poland but the entire EU will not be able to influence transformation processes in the "forgotten Europe" -- Belarus and Ukraine -- if Brussels focuses on tightening Poland's frontiers and fails to draw up attractive and comprehensive programs to make Belarusians and Ukrainians maintain their hope that some day they will also find themselves in Europe not only geographically, but also politically and economically.
BELARUSIAN TRADE UNION BOSS SACKS EDITOR OF PRESS ORGAN. Leanid Kozik, the newly appointed head of the Belarusian Trade Union Federation (FPB) (see "RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report," 23 July 2002), has fired Alyaksandr Starykevich from the post of editor in chief of the FPB press organ, "Belaruski chas," Belapan reported on 8 August. Last month the FPB Presidium voted down Kozik's proposal to sack Starykevich. "I cannot work with a newspaper that does not share my views," Kozik said in explaining his reasons for getting rid of Starykevich. "The dismissal order is an eloquent example of what has happened to collective decision-making in the FPB," Starykevich said of his ouster. Kozik, previously deputy chief of the presidential administration, is widely believed to have been sent by President Lukashenka to stifle antigovernment dissent in Belarus's trade union movement. The FPB is expected to hold a national congress in September. JM
MORE THAN 13 MILLION UKRAINIANS LIVE BELOW POVERTY LINE. The government on 8 August released a report stating that 13.1 million people in Ukraine (27.2 percent of the population) live below the poverty line, which is officially set at a monthly income of 175 hryvnas ($33) per person, UNIAN reported. Ukraine's worst poverty-stricken regions are Transcarpathian Oblast (46.6 percent were below the poverty line in 2001), Crimea (38.4 percent), and Khmelnytskyy Oblast (36.8 percent). A recent World Bank report on the global economy in 2001 includes Ukraine in a group of the world's 65 poorest countries, where GDP per capita does not exceed $745. JM
INVESTIGATORS SAID TO FOCUS ON BUSINESSES RUN BY OUR UKRAINE LAWMAKERS. Our Ukraine lawmaker Oleh Ryabchuk told UNIAN on 8 August that within the past week Ukrainian law enforcement bodies launched 20 criminal investigations against companies founded by Our Ukraine lawmakers or those in which Our Ukraine lawmakers have stakes. Ryabchuk said representatives of the Directorate for Combating Organized Crime "openly demand [that Our Ukraine lawmakers involved in those companies] leave Our Ukraine" since, Ryabchuk added, "a head-on onslaught on the part of the directorate is under way." JM
Last week, Poland concluded the Administration of Justice and Internal Affairs Chapter in its European Union accession talks in Brussels. Warsaw pledged to beef up control of its 1,200-kilometer border with Russia's Kaliningrad Oblast, Belarus, and Ukraine to prevent illegal migration, as well as smuggling of goods and trafficking of drugs and arms, after Poland joins the EU. Some Western media commented that Poland's obligations under this negotiation chapter -- the country's 26th closed chapter -- are tantamount to erecting a new "Berlin Wall" on the country's eastern and northern frontiers, which are expected to become the EU's external frontiers as early as 1 January 2004.
Poland's obligations under this chapter involve a serious overhaul of its border guards and, understandably, mean making sizeable expenditures from the state budget. Interior Minister Krzysztof Janik said in a recent press interview that in order to qualify for joining the Schengen agreements, which may take place around 2007, Poland needs $250 million euros ($245 million) to refurbish its border-guard force and infrastructure. Janik hopes that up to 75 percent of this sum may be covered by various EU funds and programs.
Last week, Poland committed itself to increasing its current border-guard force of some 12,000 servicemen and civilians to 18,000. By 2006, the country will increase the force by 3,200, hiring 5,300 professional frontier guards and 1,000 more civil servants while phasing out 3,100 army conscripts who are currently deployed.
The government plans to buy and equip seven helicopters and two light aircraft for the border guards, as well as night-vision surveillance devices and other necessary equipment. The number of frontier watchtowers will be increased in order to space them at a distance not exceeding 20 kilometers.
Poland's accession to the EU will, of course, mean tougher restrictions on travelers from Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Warsaw will introduce visa requirements for them as of 1 July 2003. At present, nobody is able to imagine the scale of technical difficulties or the political and socioeconomic consequences of this upcoming operation.
Chief EU negotiator Jan Truszczynski said last year in Brussels that in 2000, Poland was visited by 5.9 million Belarusians, 2.8 million Russians, and 6.1 million Ukrainians. The same year, Truszczynski added, Polish consulates all over the world issued only 185,000 visas.
But Truszczynski's estimates of eastern visitors to Poland may be much lower than the real figures. According to the Warsaw-based government-sponsored Center for Eastern Studies, in 2000, Poland was visited by 4.4 million Russians from Kaliningrad Oblast alone (it should be noted here that Russia's Kaliningrad exclave is inhabited by some 1 million people). Some 90 percent of these visits, the center asserts, were made by people engaged in petty cross-border trade, which primarily means smuggling of alcohol, cigarettes, and other goods.
Such cross-border business is the main source of livelihood for hundreds of thousands, if not for millions, of people in both Poland and the three above-mentioned post-Soviet countries. When Poland tightens its eastern and northern borders, there will unavoidably occur "local economic disasters" in the borderland regions of the four countries. As for Poland's eastern and northern regions, they still may hope for some assistance from Brussels under various development and restructuring programs. But who will help people living under the penury of the Lukashenka and Kuchma economies? And what about the Kaliningrad region with its highest rates of criminality and HIV infection in all of Russia?
Poland officially advertises its role as a promoter of European integration values on post-Soviet territory -- particularly in Ukraine and Belarus -- but it is hardly believable that it will be able to perform this role seriously after the line of European prosperity and affluence moves some 600 kilometers eastward and becomes a new "Berlin Wall" for Belarusians and Ukrainians for a decade or longer. It is clear even today that not only Poland but the entire EU will not be able to influence transformation processes in the "forgotten Europe" -- Belarus and Ukraine -- if Brussels focuses on tightening Poland's frontiers and fails to draw up attractive and comprehensive programs to make Belarusians and Ukrainians maintain their hope that some day they will also find themselves in Europe not only geographically, but also politically and economically.